Here we go!

So as the forecast on December 8th, 2009 predicted ("Short-Term Dollar Strength on Worldwide Crappiness") the Euro is now within spitting distance of $1.40 to the dollar. So far so good. But the ferociousness with which it smashed though its 200 day moving average makes me inclined to wait for further weakness rather then booking profits now. I believe that the Dollar will certainly hit $1.35. Depending on the management of the Grecian crisis, the Euro easily could fall further but $1.35 is a recurring motif I feel comfortable with.
(It was the exchange rate when I first started paying attention to the markets in 2005, it was the rate just before the panic began in late July 2007, and there has been a lot of congestion around $1.35 over the past year.)












In other news, readers of this blog will note that I have been pretty bearish throughout the past year. Not to the point of outright shorting the S&P 500, but certainly not holding any long U.S. equity positions either. The theme since December 6th, 2008 has been to pursue a simple "reflationary" strategy, with a diversified portfolio split between base metals (LD, +141%), rare metals (1211.HK, +524%), junk-bonds (PHDAX , 46%), Brazilian and Indian Equities (EWZ, +156%, INP, +129%), and Inflation-Protected Government Bonds (TIP, +11%). This strategy was intended to be long only, with a "buy on dips" mentality.

I believe it is time to close out this portfolio and move to cash. Investor bullishness is the highest its been since 2006. China is removing liquidity. The VIX is near its 3-year lows and Junk-Bonds have returned to yields not seen since the moments before the panic in July 2007.

We may be moving into a new phase of the crisis. The big story of the Panic of 2008 was the run on the "cyber" banks, the money-market accounts where investors park their cash. The sudden withdrawal of cash from these accounts after the Primary Reserve fund "broke the buck" ushered in a wave of forced selling as money-market accounts sold their investment holdings to meet redemptions. We are unlikely to see a liquidity panic of this sort again. It is likely that the troubles in Europe will spread in unexpected ways. The specter of a Greek sovereign default will seriously undermine faith in the European Monetary Union, and until there is a clear protocol for dealing with the Greek crisis, we may very well see a solvency panic of the sort which accompanied the failure of Lehman Brothers.

I am not suggesting that this crisis is imminent, simply that the December 6th, 2008 portfolio reallocation has made stunning, one-in-a-lifetime returns, and there is enough uncertainty to the outlook to take a breather and reflect.

I am a firm believer that equity investors must be burned three times before a true bull market can begin. I've never read this anywhere, it simply seems like a prerequisite to the necessary capitulation which allows assets values to reach appropriate valuations for the onset of a bull market. I mark the bursting of the tech bubble as burn #1 and the panic of '08 as burn #2.

As a corollary to this thought however, I would reiterate my comments of last spring. The questions regarding L, W, or V shaped recoveries are misplaced. With the increasing globalization of the world financial markets and the shifting demographic patterns between developing and developed markets, I believe we will see a W-shaped recovery in the 1st world and a V-shaped recovery in Brazil and India.

We may very well be approaching half-time in this (so far) three year long bear market. Don't let anyone try to fool you into thinking otherwise.

We teach what we cannot learn.

A "friendly experiencer" in the markets, makes his decisions amidst the deluge of sights, soundbits, and combating opinions from other experiencers market-wide. Often times our convictions are proved wrong, and when we get burned, we learn not to touch the fire. But if we're all future-blind, how are we to know the incendiary agent? We may prepare ourselves against fire, only to be scalded by a bursting steampipe. Worse, in our blindness, we may mistake the scald for a burn and learn nothing.

And so we often learn the wrong lessons, mistaking causality or blaming our own tactics. But the most malicious lesson, is the one we make when we have been burned so many times that our nerves have been seared off. We cease to be able to feel. In our numbness, we abdicate our responsibility to prepare for the next conflagration.

Today the stock market fell back 11 years in time, briefly touching a number near which Alan Greenspan gave his infamous "irrational exuberance" speech. In 1997, Greenspan was worried about the excessive valuations in the stock market. He decided to raise interest rates. The market fell 7% and then roared back. Greenspan writes, "It recouped all of its losses and gained 10 percent more, so that by mid-June, it was nearing 7,800. In effect, investors were teaching the Fed a lesson. Bob Rubin was right: you can't tell when a market is overvalued, and you can't fight market forces."

This was precisely the wrong lesson to learn. Lets review what Greenspan said in his infamous speech:

"As we move into the 21st century... one factor will continue to complicate [the] task of pinning down the notion of what constitutes a stable general price level... Where do we draw the line on what prices matter? Certainly prices of goods and services now being produced - our basic measure of inflation - matter. But what about futures prices? Or more importantly, prices of claims on future goods and services, like equities, real estate, or other earning assets? Is stability of these prices essential to the stability of the economy... How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions... and how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy?... We should not underestimate, or become complacent about, the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy."

And so after Greenspan's puny stand against asset prices (he raised interest rates 0.25%) he threw his hands in the air and abdicated all responsibility for counter-cyclical tightening, with grave consequences for us and the stability of the world economy.

He will be remembered for illustrating what he could not perform.

And for teaching what he could not learn.